The Allied amphibious operation codenamed Shingle was launched in late January 1944. It was opposed by German forces in the area of Anzio and Nettuno. Success depended on the element of surprise, and the speed with which the invaders could build up strength and move inland. This was understood by General Mark Clark, commander of the US Fifth Army, but not fully understood by his subordinate commanders. This German account focuses on the landing at Anzio as it was the only one that failed to achieve its objective of smashing the German defense and achieving operational freedom of movement. The battle lasted over six weeks, with mistakes made by leadership on both sides, and consequently also great sacrifice by solders on both sides. But the operation was not a German success either, and attempts to prevent the creation of a strong bridgehead failed. Ultimately the Allies would reach Rome, and the Allies applied lessons from this battle to facilitate the success of Overlord, launched five months later. While not complete, as the author did not have access to some of the war diaries of higher levels of German command, this is still one of the best German accounts of Operation Shingle and is here translated into English for the first time.

The Dragoon offensive in August 1944 was preceded by bombings and sabotage that hit hard the German forces located in the South of France – damaging communications, railroads and bridges. The landings were then overwhelmingly successful, despite localised German resistance. The following morning a German force the size of around four infantry battalions was able to launch a counterattack, but by the end of the day von Schwerin ordered a retreat under cover of night. What ensued was a race to retreat to the Burgundian Gate, or Belfort Gap, before they were cut off by the advancing Allied troops. The Allies had all the means for a successful pursuit, while most of the German troops, with the notable exception of the 11th Panzer Division, were largely incapable of undertaking an orderly retreat. Some units, including the LXII Corps headquarters, were surrounded and captured.This account, by Jörg Staiger, recounts the German retreat and explains how the 19th Army sacrificed divisions to enable its retreat through the Rhone Valley.

In late 1943, 362. Infanterie-Division was formed around the remnants of 268. Infanterie-Division, which had been disbanded after high casualties on the Eastern Front. It fought at Anzio in early 1944, overrun when the Allied broke through the German lines in April. During its time at Anzio, the division was involved in the Benedicta massacre. The unit was withdrawn to Rome. Facing the Allied advance, it suffered further losses and had to be rebuilt once more. Returning to the front, it then fought until late April 1945, when it surrendered. This account focuses on the efforts of 362. Infanterie-Division to turn back the Allied forces from their advance north in late 1944 and early 1945. Its commander, Heinz Greiner led the division in a series of counterattacks against Allied forces outside Rome that slowed Allied progress. While Greiner did not have access to the unit war diary while writing this account his experience as commander of 362. Infanterie-Division thoughout this period means that it offers a unique insight into the battle from the German perspective well as a thorough account of the reestablishment, training and combat performance of a German division.

This book offers a unique perspective on the decisive early weeks of the invasion in 1944, written by a German Army Corps Intelligence officer stationed in Normandy at the time of the Allied invasion, who during the invasion was the department head for enemy messages processing (Ic) in the staff of the LXXXIV AK. It discusses in detail the events leading up to the creation of Falaise Pocket, described by the author as "tragic turning point of an entire front." It also offers illuminating insights to the conditions in the American landing section and explains how the German troops based there came to be defeated. Normandy: From Cotentin to Falaise, June-July 1944 is the first full length English translation of the original edition published in German in 1954, ten years after D-Day.

"Die Wehrmacht im Kampf" Battles and Problems of the Second World War is a series originally edited by Hermann Teske and published in German in the 1950s and 1960s. Written by former members of the German Army in World War II, it provides valuable and historically significant information on the perspective of the German Army of many crucial campaigns and battles. Now being published in English for the first time, each volume has a modern introduction by Matthias Strohn, a lecturer at Sandhurst and The University of Buckingham and an expert on the German Army. This volume in the Die Wehrmacht im Kampf series examines the principles of mobile defensive operations by analysing examples of defensive combat that took place on the Eastern Front during the Second World War. It is written by Ferdinand Maria von Senger und Etterlin, a German officer in the panzer troops who fought in several defensive battles against the Russians.

In late November 1942, Soviet forces surrounded General Friedrich Paulus’ Sixth Army in a pocket at the Russian city of Stalingrad. In response, the Germans planned a relief operation, Operation Winter Thunderstorm, intended to break through the Soviet forces and open the pocket, releasing the encircled units. The 6th Panzer Division was the spearhead of the German relief force. The attack started on 12 December 1942 and was aborted on 23 December after heavy Soviet counterattacks. This failure sealed the fate of the German Sixth Army in Stalingrad. This account of the operation was first published in German in 1956, written by the well-respected military historian and retired German officer, Horst Scheibert, who was a tank commander in 6th Panzer Division during the attempt. Utilising many excerpts from war diaries, and telegrams sent during operations, it is a unique account of the entire operation from the situation in mid-November through the two German offensives, the Soviet counteroffensive and ongoing fighting until early January. This book includes 16 maps from the original edition and is the first English translation of this important German account.

This book discusses a number of raids undertaken by XXXXVIII Panzer Corps near the Black Sea in 1941/2 to explore the tactics used and why they were successful, based upon the detailed combat reports prepared by the corps staff immediately after each battle. "Die Wehrmacht im Kampf" Battles and Problems of the Second World War is a series published in Germany in the 1950s and 1960s. Written by ex-members of the German army in WWII, it provides important information not available elsewhere on the German army's perspective of many crucial campaigns and battles. None of the volumes have previously been available in English. Each volume has a modern introduction by Professor Matthias Strohn, expert on the German army.

This volume in the Die Wehrmacht im Kampf series examines Erich Hoepner's leadership of panzer formations in Poland in 1939, France in 1940, and Russia in 1941. It is written by Walter Chales de Beaulieu, a general staff officer who fought alongside Hoepner. Erich Hoepner was one of the most competent tank commanders of World War II, playing a significant role in Germany’s early successes. As the commander of the XVI Panzer Corps at the outbreak of war in 1939, Hoepner carried out the main thrust towards Warsaw. The panzer corps covered 250 kilometres and reached the outskirts of the city in only eight days. In 1940, commanding the same formation, Hoepner fought the French Cavalry Corps in Belgium, partook in the encirclement of Allied forces near Dunkirk, and advanced southwards over the Weygand Line deep into French territory. In 1941, Hoepner became the commander of Panzer Group 4, which was the main attack formation for the advance on Leningrad. It made rapid progress to begin with, but an increasingly wide and exposed front meant that the attack gradually ground to a halt. After one final attempt to capture the city in the middle of September failed, the panzer group was redeployed to the central sector of the Eastern Front. It was there that the panzer group was to help with the push towards Moscow. In conjunction with Panzer Group 3, Hoepner’s Panzer Group 4 completed and eliminated the Vyazma pocket. Hoepner frequently felt that he was not allowed to advance on Moscow quickly enough by his superiors, yet his decision to conduct a withdrawal in January 1942 led to his dismissal. In this book, Walter Chales de Beaulieu provides insight into Erich Hoepner’s ability as a panzer commander, painting a picture of a man who was committed to the military profession, who possessed a strong sense of responsibility, and who was confident enough to exercise his own will.

In 1941, military operations were conducted by large formations along the northern coast of Scandinavia – for the first time in history of warfare. A modern army suddenly swept into that isolated and inhospitable region that was yet to possess the level of importance it would later assume in Cold War polar strategy. The Arctic Front was the northernmost theatre in the war waged by Germany against Russia. For a period of four years, German troops from all branches of the Wehrmacht fought side by side with Finnish border guard units. The high point of the war on the Arctic Front was the assembly and advance of Germany’s Mountain Corps Norway in the summer and autumn of 1941. Commanded by general of the mountain troops, Eduard Dietl, and composed of the 2nd and 3rd Mountain Divisions, the Mountain Corps advanced out of occupied North Norway, assembled in the Petsamo Corridor in North Finland, and struck into Russian territory in an attempt to seize Murmansk. It did not reach its objective. This account of the operation was written by Wilhelm Hess, quartermaster of the Mountain Corps Norway. He draws upon his personal experience of the conditions and actions on the Arctic Front in order to describe and analyse the environment, the sequence of events, and the reasons behind certain decisions. In addition to describing how operations conducted by the Mountain Corps unfolded, Hess provides insight as to how the terrain, the flow of supplies, and the war at sea impacted those operations.

Published for the first time in English, this is a German account of the German invasionof Norway in the spring of 1940. It focuses on the efforts of Group “1” led by Eduard Dietl. This group of gebirgstruppen was landed at Narvik in early April by tendestroyers. These ships were then all sunk by the Allies. Dietl’s troops wereoutnumbered by Allied troops but his defense utilized ammunition, food and sailorsfrom the sunken ships and his men retook Narvik once the Allies abandoned theirefforts to push the Germans out of Norway.

At the launch of Operation Barbarossa, Army Group North was tasked with the operational objective of Leningrad—what lay between it and the city was 800 kilometers of the Baltic states, and 18-20 infantry divisions, two cavalry divisions, and eight or nine mechanised brigades of the Red Army. It was apparent that in order to succeed they would have to race through to the western Dvina and establish a bridgehead before the Russians exploited this natural feature to organise a defensive front. Panzer Group 4, which included LVI Panzer Corps and XLI Panzer Corps, was to lead the way. By the end of the first day the group had pushed 70 kilometers into enemy territory. Red counterattacks on their unprotected flanks slowed them down, resulting in the tank battle of Raseiniai, but the group managed to capture Dünaburg on the Western Dvina on June 26, with a bridgehead established shortly thereafter. The group then pushed northeast through Latvia to the Stalin Line. In mid-July Hoepner was preparing to push the last 100 kilometers to Leningrad, however Leeb, commander of the army group, had other plans for the group and the advance did not continue for several more weeks. This account of Panzer Group 4's advance was written by Walter Chales de Beaulieu, chief of staff of Panzer Group 4. Published in German in 1961, this is the first English translation. Beaulieu not only gives a detailed account of the Panzer Group's advance, but also offers an assessment of the fighting, an examination of how Panzer Group 4's operations were affected by the limitations imposed on Army Group North, and the lessons that can be learnt from its experiences in the Baltic States. He concludes with a discussion of whether Leningrad could ever have been taken.

The port of Tobruk, Libya, was besieged by German and Italian forces in April 1941. Following an abortive attempt in June, the Allies tried to relieve the siege in late November, when the Eighth Army launched Operation Crusader, which aimed at destroying the Axis armored force then advancing. After a number of inconclusive engagements, the British 7th Armoured Division was defeated by the Afrika Korps at Sidi Rezegh. Edwin Rommel was then forced to withdraw his troops to the defensive line at Gazala, making the operation the first Allied victory over German land forces in World War II. This account of the tank warfare during Operation Crusader in front of Tobruk in the fall of 1941 examines the roles of commanders in the battles of Operation Crusader, in particular the part of Erwin Rommel, who achieved some defensive successes during the battle. As well as examining the part of commanders, it discusses the parameters of the battle: the terrain, weather, visibility, logistics, intelligence, and the forces involved. It then narrates the course of the battle, and the result of the battle.

In 1943 the tide began to turn against Germany on the Eastern Front. Their summer offensive, Operation Citadel, was a failure, and the Red Army seized the initiative, despite appallingly high losses. Waging a war of attrition, the Russians gradually pushed Germany’s Army Group South back. By October 1943 the Russians had reached the Dnepr in Ukraine, Kiev was liberated, and the scene was set for the events described in this book, written by a high-ranking General Nikolaus von Vormann, who commanded XLVII. Panzerkorps.The battle of Cherkassy is also known as the Korsun Pocket, Korsun being the small town at the centre of the area containing the surrounded German forces. After sudden attacks by the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts, in January 1944 the Russians achieved a major encirclement of six German divisions, a total of 60,000 soldiers. The Red Army had the numerical advantage, but two of the Panzer divisions were in good shape, and thus a dramatic battle ensued, with each side both attacking and defending. Strenuous efforts to avoid another Stalingrad were made, with the Germans led by Erich von Manstein attempting to break into the pocket. Atrocious weather plus effective resistance repulsed their attacks and by mid-February it became clear that breaking out of the pocket was the only option for the Germans. Abandoning a huge amount of equipment and the wounded, they succeeded and rejoined the surrounding panzer divisions. The Germans avoided a catastrophe but 34% of the troops did not survive.Generalleutnant von Vormann’s account starts with the retreat to the Dnepr in 1943, describes the battle of Kirowograd from 5th-17th January 1944, the encirclement, the efforts to relieve the trapped troops, the struggle of the troops within the pocket, and the breakout. His mainly factual account also contains a description of the psychological effects on the men of this most brutal and physically exhausting battle. It is one of the few primary source materials that exists and is therefore of significant historical interest.

The German Army invaded France on 10 May 1940, and in just over ten days their rapid advance, led by three panzer corps, had left three French field armies, Belgian forces and the British Expeditionary Force with their backs to the sea, trapped along the northern coast of France. General Gort realised that evacuation was the only option, and so began a chaotic withdrawal towards the port of Dunkirk.While the Luftwaffe continued to attack pockets of Allied forces, the German ground forces were ordered to halt their advance on 22 May. These orders were changed four days later, but these crucial four days of inaction allowed the Allies time to retreat into Dunkirk and prepare a defensive perimeter.The fighting during the last days of May was desperate, with the remnants of the French First Army surrounded at Lille, holding off seven German divisions until finally forced to surrender, and the Belgian Army forced to capitulate to the east of Dunkirk. Though the cost was devastatingly high, Dunkirk was held long enough for over 300,000 Allied troops to be evacuated back to England, with the remainder of the rearguard of French troops surrendering on 4 June.The British narrative of the retreat and evacuation that prompted perhaps Winston Churchill's most famous wartime speech has always been well-known; however only now is Hans-Adolf Jacobsen's detailed account of the battle from the German perspective available in English.

The city of Vitebsk in Belarus was of strategic importance during the fighting on the Eastern Front, as it controlled the route to Minsk. A salient in the German lines, Vitebsk had been declared a Festerplatz—a fortress town—meaning that it must be held at all costs. a task handed to 3rd Panzer Army in 1943. Otto Heidkämper was chief of staff of Georg-Hans Reinhardt's 3rd Panzer Army, Army Group Center, which was stationed around Vitebsk and Smolensk from early 1942 until June 1944. His detailed account of the defense of Vitebsk through the winter of 1943 into 1944, right up to the Soviet summer offensive a valuable first-hand account of how the operations around Vitebsk played out. Twenty maps accompany the narrative. During this time 3rd Panzer Army undertook numerous military operations to defend the area against the Soviets; they also engaged in anti-partisan operations in the area, deporting civilians accused of supporting partisans and destroying property. Finally, in June 1944, the Soviets amassed four armies to take Vitebsk, which was then held by 38,000 men of 53rd Corps. Within three days Vitebsk was encircled, with 53rd Corps trapped inside. Attempts to break the encirclement failed, and resistance in the pocket broke down over the next few days. On June 27, the final destruction of German resistance in Vitebsk was completed. Twenty thousand Germans were dead and another 10,000 had been captured.

Hermann Hoth led Germany’s 3rd Panzer Group in Army Group Center - in tandem with Guderian’s 2nd Group - during the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. Together those two daring panzer commanders achieved a series of astounding victories, encircling entire Russian armies at Minsk, Smolensk, and Vyazma, all the way up to the very gates of Moscow. In this work, originally published in German in 1956, Hoth discusses his exact command decisions during Barbarossa - still the largest continental offensive ever undertaken - to reveal new insights into how Germany could, and in his view should, have succeeded in the campaign. Hoth analyses the origin, development, and objective of the plan, and presents the situations confronted, the decisions taken, and the mistakes made by the army’s leadership, as the new form of mobile warfare startled not only the Soviets but the German leadership itself, which failed to provide support infrastructure for their panzer arm’s breakthroughs. Hoth sheds light on the decisive and ever-escalating struggle between Hitler and his military advisers on the question whether, after the Dnieper and the Dvina had been reached, to adhere to the original idea of capturing Moscow. He then finally considers in detail whether the Germans, after obliterating the remaining Russian armies facing Army Group Center in Operation Typhoon, could still hope for the occupation of the Russian capital Hoth concludes his study with several lessons for the future offensive use of armored formations. His firsthand analysis is vital reading for every student of World War II.