Although US involvement in the Vietnam conflict began long before 1965, Lyndon Johnson's substantial large commitment of combat troops that year marked the official beginning of America's longest twentieth-century war. By 1969, after years of intense fighting and thousands of casualties, an increasing number of Americans wanted the United States out of Vietnam. Richard Nixon looked for a way to pull out while preserving the dignity of the United States at home and abroad, and at the same time, to support the anticommunist Republic of Vietnam. Ultimately, he settled on the strategy of Vietnamization—the gradual replacement of US soldiers with South Vietnamese forces. Drawing on newly declassified documents and international archives, Unwilling to Quit dissects the domestic and foreign contexts of America's withdrawal from the Vietnam War. David L. Prentice demonstrates how congressional and presidential politics were a critical factor in Nixon's decision to abandon his hawkish sensibilities in favor of de-escalation. Prentice reframes Nixon's choices, emphasizes Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird's outsized yet subtle role in the decision-making process, and considers how South Vietnam's Nguyen Van Thieu and North Vietnam's Le Duan decisively shaped the American exit. Prentice brings Vietnamese voices into the discussion and underscores the unprecedented influence of American civilians on US foreign policy during the Vietnamization era.

Between 1945 and 1965, more than fifty nations declared their independence from colonial rule. At the height of the Cold War, the global process of decolonization complicated US-Soviet relations, while Soviet and American interventionism transformed the decolonizing process. Remaking the World examines the connections between the Cold War and decolonization, which helped define the post-World War II global order. Drawing on new scholarship, this comprehensive study provides a chronological overview from World War I to the Soviet collapse and highlights key developments in the international system as decolonization unfolded in tandem with the Cold War. Through six carefully selected case studies - India, Egypt, the Congo, Vietnam, Angola, and Iran - historian Jessica M. Chapman addresses the shifting of Soviet, American, Chinese, and Cuban policies, the centrality of modernization, the role of the United Nations, the often-outsized influence of regional actors like Israel and South Africa, and seminal post-Vietnam War shifts in the international system. Each of the case studies analyzes at least one geopolitical turning point, demonstrating that the Cold War and decolonization were mutually constitutive processes in which local, national, and regional developments altered the superpower competition. Chapman presents a picture of the complexities of international relations and the ways in which local communist and democratic movements differed from their Soviet and American ties, as did their visions for independence and success.

One of the defining features of United States foreign policy since World War II has been the nation's special relationship with Israel. This informal alliance, rooted in shared values and culture, grew out of a moral obligation to promote Israel's survival in the aftermath of the Holocaust as US policymakers provided military aid, weapons, and political protection. In return, Israel served American interests through efforts to contain communism and terrorism in the region. Today, the US provides almost four billion dollars in military aid per year, which raises questions regarding interest and propriety: At what point does US support for Israel exceed the boundaries of the countries' unconventional relationship and become counterproductive to other national interests, including the pursuit of peace in the Middle East? Kenneth Kolander provides a vital new perspective on the US-Israel bond by focusing on Congress's role in developing and maintaining the special relationship during a crucial period. Previous studies have focused on the executive branch, but Kolander demonstrates that US-Israel relations did not follow a course preferred by successive presidential administrations, especially in the 1960s and 1970s. Instead, he illuminates how influential lobbyists, America's affinity for Israel and antipathy towards Arabs, and economic pressures influenced legislators and inspired congressional action in support of Israel. In doing so, he presents an essential investigation of the ways in which legislators exert influence in foreign policy and adds new depth to the historiography of an important dynamic in postwar world politics.

They were known as "political soulmates" who shared a "special relationship". Grounded in similar democratic systems, common historical discourses, and sustained military alliance through several of the twentieth century's most contentious conflicts, British prime minister Margaret Thatcher and the American president Ronald Reagan shared a deep respect, admiration, and friendship, as well as similar ideologies. Many analysts and historians recycle a popular conception of the two New Right leaders joined at the hip politically, yet their relationship was more complex and nuanced. Drawing on a host of recently declassified documents from the Reagan-Thatcher years, A Diplomatic Meeting: Reagan, Thatcher, and the Art of Summitry, provides an innovative basis to understand the development and nature of the relationship between the two leaders. Author James Cooper boldly challenges the popular conflation of the leaders' platforms and proposes that Reagan and Thatcher's summitry demonstrated that foreign policy was not distinct from domestic policy: there was just policy, and the related politics of it. Summits, therefore, were a significant opportunity for world leaders to further their own domestic agenda. Cooper utilizes the relationship between Reagan and Thatcher to demonstrate that summitry politics transcended any distinction between foreign policy and domestic politics - a major objective of Reagan and Thatcher as they sought to consolidate power and implement their domestic economic programs in a parallel quest to reverse notions of their countries' "decline". This unique and significant study about the making of the Reagan-Thatcher relationship uses their key meetings as avenues of exploration and argues that there is fluidity between the domestic and international spheres, which is underappreciated within existing interpretations of the leaders' relationship, Anglo-American relations and, more broadly, in the realm of international affairs.

"As with sailing, so with politics: make your cloth too taut and your ship will dip and heel, but slacken off and trim your sails, and things head up again." - Euripides, Orestes The Great Depression of the 1930s and the global crisis of World War II created ripe conditions for change in both US and international politics, setting off many questions regarding America's role in the world. The power and influence held by the United States at this time informed Franklin Roosevelt's belief that the country was optimally positioned to become a world leader. As such, his decisions and actions preceding the war were a critical juncture in twentieth-century US foreign policy and responsible for the nation's eventual entrance into the war. Scholarship often presents the 32nd President as an isolationist with little continuity or initiative in his approach to world politics. Based on a new, interpretive framework, however, FDR's actions take on a more purposeful tack. The Sailor: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Transformation of American Foreign Policy, 1933-1945 examines Roosevelt's worldview and political ideology throughout his career to understand how they shaped the policies he developed in response to the crises that arose during his presidency. Author David Schmitz explains why Roosevelt found the traditional foreign policy of neutrality inadequate and shows how the president spurred a new, internationalist approach in the United States' dealings with other actors on the global stage. Arguing against existing scholarship that suggests FDR rarely made informed foreign policy decisions, Schmitz claims that the president was consistent and calculating in his outlook and actions involving international affairs and the direction of American foreign policy. Guided by a vision of peace and American security, Schmitz argues that Roosevelt pursued a "Third Way" between imperialism and revolution: a pro-Western nationalism built upon organized, international collaboration with a focus toward promoting and protecting American values and institutions. Schmitz shows how Roosevelt intentionally carried out this vision in the hopes of bringing about "an end to the beginnings of all wars."The Sailor is an important interpretive analysis of the Roosevelt administration's foreign policy. By challenging previously held assumptions, Schmitz constructs a new narrative about FDR's overall attitude to the US and its role in a postwar world. He shows how FDR successfully transformed US neutrality into US internationalism, forever changing the direction of American foreign policy. This work will appeal to scholars and general readers alike, specifically, those interested in Franklin Roosevelt, World War II, and American foreign relations.

One of the defining features of United States foreign policy since World War II has been the nation's special relationship with Israel. This informal alliance, rooted in shared values and culture, grew out of a moral obligation to promote Israel's survival in the aftermath of the Holocaust as US policymakers provided military aid, weapons, and political protection. In return, Israel served American interests through efforts to contain communism and terrorism in the region. Today, the US provides almost four billion dollars in military aid per year, which raises questions regarding interest and propriety: At what point does US support for Israel exceed the boundaries of the countries' unconventional relationship and become counterproductive to other national interests, including the pursuit of peace in the Middle East? Kenneth Kolander provides a vital new perspective on the US-Israel bond by focusing on Congress's role in developing and maintaining the special relationship during a crucial period. Previous studies have focused on the executive branch, but Kolander demonstrates that US-Israel relations did not follow a course preferred by successive presidential administrations, especially in the 1960s and 1970s. Instead, he illuminates how influential lobbies, America's affinity for Israel and antipathy towards Arabs, and economic pressures influenced legislators and inspired congressional action in support of Israel. In doing so, he presents an essential investigation of the ways in which legislators exert influence in foreign policy and adds new depth to the historiography of an important dynamic in postwar world politics.

Although the game is known by many names around the world - football, fútbol, Fußball, voetbal - soccer is a universal language. Throughout the past century, governments have used soccer to further their diplomatic aims through a range of actions including boycotts, carefully orchestrated displays at matches, and more. In turn, soccer organizations have leveraged their power over membership and tournament decisions to play a role in international relations. In Soccer Diplomacy, an international group of experts analyzes the relationship between soccer and diplomacy. Together, they investigate topics such as the use of soccer as a tool of nation-state - based diplomacy, soccer as a non-state actor, and the relationship between soccer and diplomatic actors in subnational, national, and transnational contexts. They also examine the sport as a conduit for representation, communication, and negotiation.Drawing on a wealth of historical examples, the contributors demonstrate that governments must frequently address soccer as part of their diplomatic affairs. They argue that this single sport - more than the Olympics, other regional multisport competitions, or even any other sport - reveals much about international relations, how states attempt to influence foreign views, and regional power dynamics.

In August 1974, while Richard Nixon resigned and Gerald Ford began a prolonged battle with Congress over executive power, a crisis was occurring in Cyprus. Desperate to shore up its declining popularity with a foreign policy triumph, the military government of Greece tried to overthrow the government of the independent island nation. In response, the Republic of Turkey invaded Cyprus in order to protect Turkish Cypriots. The invasion led to the downfall of the junta in Athens, the beginning of a United States embargo on arms sales to its ally Turkey, and years of increased tension and mistrust between the two nations. In his book, James F. Goode offers a revolutionary analysis of the complex factors leading to the imposition and continuance of the Turkish Arms Embargo. He demonstrates that, alone, the human rights issues surrounding the invasion fail to explain the resulting US-Turkish estrangement. Instead, he contends, factors including deep-seated "Turkophobia," growing concern about a deadly heroin epidemic in the United States, and pro-Greek lobbies played important roles in heightening tensions and extending the embargo.Goode draws on newly available archival materials from the Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter Presidential Libraries as well as the personal papers of key senators and congressmen to present the most complete analysis of the affair to date. This timely study will not only change how this period is understood, but it will also provide valuable insights into the future of international relations.

When the United States entered World War I, President Woodrow Wilson declared to Congress that the objective was not merely to bring "a new balance of power," but rather to bring a "just and secure peace" to the world by the end of the conflict. In this famous speech, known as "The Fourteen Points," Wilson offered the world a road map toward a more equitable international system in the midst of unprecedented global conflict, including ideas on the interconnectedness of democracy, trade, and the concept of a forum for peaceably resolving international disputes. Even decades after the end of the First World War, Wilson's ideas remained important and influenced many of his successors. But now, in the twenty-first century, there are forces at work in the world that Wilson could never have imagined, and those forces call for a new plan toward peace.In Fourteen Points for the Twenty-First Century: A Renewed Appeal for Cooperative Internationalism, Richard H. Immerman and Jeffrey A. Engel bring together a diverse group of thinkers who take up Wilson's call for a new world order by exploring fourteen new directions for the twenty-first century. The contributors -- scholars, policymakers, entrepreneurs, poets, doctors, and scientists -- propose solutions to contemporary challenges such as migration, global warming, health care, food security, and privacy in the digital age. Taken together, these points challenge American leaders and policymakers to champion an international effort, not to make America great again, but to work cooperatively with other nations on the basis of mutual respect.

"It used to be," soon-to-be secretary of state Madeleine K. Albright said in 1996, "that the only way a woman could truly make her foreign policy views felt was by marrying a diplomat and then pouring tea on an offending ambassador's lap."This world of US diplomacy excluded women for a variety of misguided reasons: they would let their emotions interfere with the task of diplomacy, they were not up to the deadly risks that could arise overseas, and they would be unable to cultivate the social contacts vital to success in the field. The men of the State Department objected but had to admit women, including the first female ambassadors: Ruth Bryan Owen, Florence "Daisy" Harriman, Perle Mesta, Eugenie Anderson, Clare Boothe Luce, and Frances Willis. These were among the most influential women in US foreign relations in their era.Using newly available archival sources, Philip Nash examines the history of the "Big Six" and how they carved out their rightful place in history. After a chapter capturing the male world of American diplomacy in the early twentieth century, the book devotes one chapter to each of the female ambassadors and delves into a number of topics, including their backgrounds and appointments, the issues they faced while on the job, how they were received by host countries, the complications of protocol, and the press coverage they received, which was paradoxically favorable yet deeply sexist. In an epilogue that also provides an overview of the role of women in modern US diplomacy, Nash reveals how these trailblazers helped pave the way for more gender parity in US foreign relations.

Did President Reagan's hawkish policies destroy the Soviet Union and enable the United States to win the Cold War? Many Americans believe this to be the case. In this view -- known as "triumphalism" -- Reagan's denunciations of the "evil empire" and his military buildup compelled Moscow to admit defeat. The president's triumph demonstrates that America's leaders should stand strong and threaten adversaries into submission.Drawing on both US and Soviet sources, this study demonstrates that triumphalism is a series of falsehoods about President Reagan's intentions, his policies, and the impact his administration had on the Soviet Union. In reality, the president's initially hardline posture undermined US interests and brought the superpowers to the brink of war. This work exposes Reagan's dedication to diplomacy and his unorthodox views about global security, which frequently brought him into conflict with his own advisers and allies. The president did not seek to destroy the USSR; rather, he sought to eliminate nuclear weapons.This volume also explains why Moscow chose to abandon the arms race, adopt democratic reforms, and withdraw from its ill-fated war in Afghanistan. These initiatives were part of a reform movement that had been growing in the USSR for decades before Reagan entered office. The Kremlin did not acquiesce to American pressure; rather, Soviet reformers believed the arms race had been futile and sought to move beyond the Cold War. In fact, President Reagan's initially aggressive policies had made it more difficult for Moscow to pursue these revolutionary reforms. Ultimately President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev together were able to accomplish what no one at the time thought possible -- the peaceful conclusion of the Cold War. The president's opposition to nuclear weapons, his determined leadership, and his dedication to diplomacy are his most enduring legacies.

Despite French President Charles de Gaulle's persistent efforts to constructively share French experience and use his resources to help engineer an American exit from Vietnam, the Kennedy administration responded to de Gaulle's peace initiatives with bitter silence and inaction. The administration's response ignited a series of events that dealt a massive blow to American prestige across the globe, resulting in the deaths of over fifty-eight thousand American soldiers and turning hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese citizens into refugees.This history of Franco-American relations during the Kennedy presidency explores how and why France and the US disagreed over the proper western strategy for the Vietnam War. France clearly had more direct political experience in Vietnam, but France's postwar decolonization cemented Kennedy's perception that the French were characterized by a toxic mixture of short-sightedness, stubbornness, and indifference to the collective interests of the West.At no point did the Kennedy administration give serious consideration to de Gaulle's proposals or entertain the notion of using his services as an honest broker in order to disengage from a situation that was rapidly spiraling out of control. Kennedy's Francophobia, the roots of which appear in a selection of private writings from Kennedy's undergraduate years at Harvard, biased his decision-making. The course of action Kennedy chose in 1963, a rejection of the French peace program, all but handcuffed Lyndon Johnson into formally entering a war he knew the United States had little chance of winning.

This insightful collection of essays details the political life of one of the most prominent and gifted American statesmen of the twentieth century. From his early training in international law to his five terms in the US Senate, J. William Fulbright (1905--1995) had a profound influence on US foreign policy, and his vision for mutual understanding shaped the extraordinary exchange program bearing his name. As a senator for Arkansas for thirty years and the longest serving chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Fulbright was one of the most influential figures of United States politics. His criticism of US involvement in Vietnam exemplified his belief in the effective management of international norms by international organizations -- including the United Nations, which was the subject of his first bill in Congress. Yet alongside his commitments to liberal internationalism and multilateral governance, Fulbright was a southern politician who embraced the interests of the region's conservative white population. This juxtaposition of biased and broad-minded objectives shows a divide at the center of Fulbright's vision, which still has consequences for America's global policies today.This multidimensional volume covers Fulbright's development as a national and global voice on foreign relations, as he wrestled with the political controversies of the US South during the civil rights movement, worked with and challenged executive power, and shaped the Fulbright program for educational exchange.

The division of Korea in August 1945 was one of the most consequential foreign policy decisions of the twentieth century. Despite the enormous impact this split has had on international relations from the Cold War to the present, comparatively little has been done to explain the decision. In Foreign Friends: Syngman Rhee, American Exceptionalism, and the Division of Korea, author David P. Fields argues that the division resulted not from a snap decision made by US military officers at the end of World War II but from a forty-year lobbying campaign spearheaded by Korean nationalist Syngman Rhee.Educated in an American missionary school in Seoul, Rhee understood the importance of exceptionalism in American society. Alleging that the US turned its back on the most rapidly Christianizing nation in the world when it acquiesced to Japan's annexation of Korea in 1905, Rhee constructed a coalition of American supporters to pressure policymakers to right these historical wrongs by supporting Korea's independence. Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, Rhee and his Korean supporters reasoned that the American abandonment of Korea had given the Japanese a foothold in Asia, tarnishing the US claim to leadership in the opinion of millions of Asians.By transforming Korea into a moralist tale of the failures of American foreign policy in Asia, Rhee and his camp turned the country into a test case of American exceptionalism in the postwar era. Division was not the outcome they sought, but their lobbying was a crucial yet overlooked piece that contributed to this final resolution. Through its systematic use of the personal papers and diary of Syngman Rhee, as well as its serious examination of American exceptionalism, Foreign Friends synthesizes religious, intellectual, and diplomatic history to offer a new interpretation of US-Korean relations.

The Civil War marked a significant turning point in American history -- not only for the United States itself but also for its relations with foreign powers both during and after the conflict. The friendship and foreign policy partnership between President Abraham Lincoln and Secretary of State William Henry Seward shaped those US foreign policies. These unlikely allies, who began as rivals during the 1860 presidential nomination, helped ensure that America remained united and prospered in the aftermath of the nation's consuming war. In Lincoln, Seward, and US Foreign Relations in the Civil War Era, Joseph A. Fry examines the foreign policy decisions that resulted from this partnership and the legacy of those decisions. Lincoln and Seward, despite differences in upbringing, personality, and social status, both adamantly believed in the preservation of the union and the need to stymie slavery. They made that conviction the cornerstone of their policies abroad, and through those policies, such as Seward threatening war with any nation that intervened in the Civil War, they prevented European intervention that could have led to Northern defeat. The Union victory allowed America to resume imperial expansion, a dynamic that Seward sustained beyond Lincoln's death during his tenure as President Andrew Johnson's Secretary of State.Fry's analysis of the Civil War from an international perspective and the legacy of US policy decisions provides a more complete view of the war and a deeper understanding of this crucial juncture in American history.

Lyndon Johnson was often blamed for abandoning Kennedy's vision of development and progress in Latin America in favor of his own domestic concerns: anti-communism and economic stability. Johnson, along with his fellow Texan and chief adviser on inter-American affairs Thomas C. Mann, nonetheless offered a vision for American engagement with the developing world even as congressional funding and public enthusiasm for such programs waned and Johnson's presidency collapsed under the weight of the Vietnam War. This book explores Lyndon Johnson's Latin American policy, from his key advisers to development programs and military interventions, to establish a new perspective on the impact of a complex and controversial president on a tumultuous period in the history of the Western Hemisphere. Demonstrating that much of the negative coverage of their efforts emerged from disgruntled Kennedy loyalists, Tunstall Allcock argues that Johnson and Mann were both New Dealers who possessed a keen desire to operate as good neighbors and support Latin American development and regional integration while dealing with domestic pressure from both right and left.Based on extensive primary research in multiple archives, this much-needed book provides a crucial exploration of how inter-American relations transitioned from the enthusiasm and excitement of the Kennedy years to the neglect and frustration of the Nixon presidency.