After the guns of Manassas fell silent, the opposing armies grappled for position wondering what would come next. Popular history has us believe that daily briefings reported something along the lines of “All quiet along the Potomac.” Reality was altogether different. In fact, the fall and early winter of 1861 was a hotbed of activity that culminated in the December combat at Dranesville. The Union victory—sorely needed after the string of defeats at Bull Run, Wilson’s Creek, and Ball’s Bluff—was small when measured against what was to come; it also helped shape the bloody years to follow.Ryan Quint’s The Battle of Dranesville: Early War in Northern Virginia, December 1861 is the first full history of that narrow but critically important slice of the war. No one knew what was coming, but for the first time in a long while civilians (sympathetic to both sides) were thrown into a spreading civil war of their own as neighbor turned on neighbor. In time, this style of warfare, both on the home front and on the battlefield, came for the small town of Dranesville in Fairfax County.Quint’s mostly forgotten tale uses overlooked or underused sources to sweep readers along from the White House and Secession Hall in Charleston to midnight ambushes and the climatic Dranesville action. A host of characters and commands that would become household names cut their teeth during these months, including Generals Jeb Stuart and Edward Ord, and the Pennsylvania Reserves, whose baptism of fire at Dranesville set the Keystone State soldiers on a path to becoming one of the best combat units of the entire war. Though soon eclipsed by larger and bloodier battles, Dranesville remained a defining moment for many of its participants—soldiers and civilians alike—for the rest of their lives.Here, for the first time, shared through the eyes of those who lived it, is the story of Dranesville and the early war in Northern Virginia.

Even before the guns fell silent at Gettysburg, Robert E. Lee was preparing for the arduous task of getting his defeated army back safely into Virginia. It was an enormous, complex, and exceedingly dangerous undertaking, told here in exciting fashion by Bradley M. Gottfried and Linda I. Gottfried in Race to the Potomac: Lee and Meade after Gettysburg, July 4-14, 1863, the latest Emerging Civil War series entry.General Lee’s first major decision was the assembly of two wagon trains, one to transport the wounded and the other to deliver the tons of supplies acquired by the army as it roamed across Pennsylvania and Maryland on the way to Gettysburg. Once the wagons trains were set, he mapped out routes for his infantry and artillery on different roads to speed the journey and protect his command.Unsure of his opponent’s next move, George Meade, the victor of Gettysburg, dispatched Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick’s VI Corps on a reconnaissance-in-force. The thrust found the Confederate infantry in full retreat; Meade finally had the confirmation he needed that Lee was heading back to Virginia. Meade decided to launch a pursuit along different routes hoping to catch his beaten enemy without unduly exposing his own troops to a devastating counterattack or ambush.Union cavalry moved out after the vulnerable Confederate wagon trains, and the encounters that followed, including several engagements with Jeb Stuart’s horsemen, resulted in the loss of hundreds of vehicles and the capture of large numbers of wounded and tons of valuable supplies. The majority of Lee’s wagons reached Williamsport, Maryland, only to find the pontoon bridge gone—cut loose by Union troops in the area. Lee’s army reached Hagerstown, Maryland, largely unscathed and began building a strong defensive line while a pontoon bridge was built across the Potomac at Falling Waters.Meade refused to rush headlong against attack Lee’s new position, and the Confederates began crossing the river on the night of July 13-14. The last of Lee’s troops crossed on the morning of the 14th, thus ending the high-stakes drama of the “race to the Potomac.”

Often relegated to a backseat by action in the Eastern Theater, the Western Theater is actually where the Federal armies won the Civil War. In the West, General Ulysses S. Grant strung together a series of victories that ultimately led him to oversee Robert E. Lee's surrender at Appomattox Court House and, eventually, two terms in the White House. In the West, the fall of Atlanta secured Lincoln's reelection for his own second term. In the West, Federal armies split the Confederacy in two - and then split it in two again. In the West, Federal armies inexorably advanced, gobbling up huge swaths of territory in the face of ineffective Confederate opposition. By war's end, General William T. Sherman had marched the "Western Theater" all the way into central North Carolina. In the Eastern Theater, the principal armies fought largely within a 100-mile corridor between the capitals of Washington, D.C., and Richmond, Virginia, with a few ill-fated Confederate invasions north of the Mason-Dixon Line. The Western Theater, in contrast, included the entire area between the Appalachian Mountains and the Mississippi River, from Kentucky in the north to the Gulf of Mexico in the south - a vast geographic expanse that, even today, can be challenging to understand. The Western Theater of War: Favorite Stories and Fresh Perspectives from the Historians at Emerging Civil War revisits some of the Civil War's most legendary battlefields: Shiloh, Chickamauga, Franklin, the March to the Sea, and more.

The American Civil War is often called the first “modern war.” Sandwiched between the Napoleonic Wars and World War I, it spawned a host of “firsts” and is considered a precursor to the larger and more deadly 20th century wars. Confederate Gen. James Longstreet made overlooked but profound modern contributions to the art of war. Retired Lt. Col. Harold M. Knudsen explains what Longstreet did and how he did it in James Longstreet and the American Civil War: The Confederate General Who Fought the Next War now released in paperback.Initially, commanders on both sides extensively utilized Napoleonic tactics that were obsolete because of the advent of the rifled musket and better artillery. Some professional army officers worked to improve tactics, operations, and strategies. On the Confederate side, a careful comparison of Longstreet’s body of work in the field to modern military doctrine reveals several large-scale innovations.Longstreet understood early that the tactical defense was generally dominant over the offense, which was something few grasped in 1862. Longstreet’s thinking demonstrated a clear evolution that began on the field at First Manassas in July 1861, developed through the bloody fighting of 1862, and culminated in the brilliant defensive victory at Fredericksburg that December. The lethality with which his riflemen and artillery mowed down repeated Union assaults hinted at what was to come in World War I. Longstreet’s ability to launch and control powerful offensives was on display at Second Manassas in August 1862. His assault plan at Chickamauga in Georgia the following September was similar, if not the forerunner to, World War II tactical-level German armored tactics. Other areas show progressive applications with artillery, staff work, force projection, and operational-level thinking.Longstreet was not the sole agent of modern change away from the Napoleonic method, but his contributions were significant and executed on a large scale. They demonstrated that he was a modern thinker unparalleled in the Confederate Army.Unfortunately, many Civil War students have a one-sided view of Longstreet, whose legacy fell victim to bitter postwar Southern politics when “Old Pete” supported Reconstruction bills, accepted postings with the Grant Administration, and criticized Robert E. Lee. Many modern writers continue to skew the general’s legacy.This book draws heavily upon 20th century U.S. Army doctrine, field training, staff planning, command, and combat experience and is the first serious treatment of Longstreet’s generalship vis-a-vis modern warfare. Not everyone will agree with Knudsen’s conclusions, but it will now be impossible to write about the general without referencing this important study.

Few students of the Civil War know that legendary historian Edwin C. Bearss produced a classic study on the little-known but significant Tupelo Campaign. The fighting in Mississippi has been overshadowed by Nathan Bedford Forrest’s more spectacular victory at Brice’s Crossroads a month earlier. Bearss performed the research and writing for the Department of the Interior in 1969, and only a handful of softcover copies were produced and circulated. It is published here for the first time, with the assistance of award-winning author David A. Powell, as Outwitting Forrest: The Tupelo Campaign in Mississippi, June 22 - July 23, 1864 .The engagement came about when Maj. Gen. A. J. Smith marched a Federal expeditionary force consisting of his 16th Army Corps into northern Mississippi in early July. The thrust forced a response, the largest of which was delivered by the combined Confederate cavalry commands of Stephen D. Lee (who was in general command) and Forrest. The tactical result was a Union defensive success. The larger Confederate strategic play, however—one that might have changed the course of the war in the Western Theater—would have been to unleash Forrest on a raid into Middle Tennessee to destroy the single line of railroad track feeding and suppling the Union armies of William T. Sherman in his ongoing operations around Atlanta. Instead, his men were contained with the Magnolia State, where his combat effectiveness was severely damaged. Editor Powell has left Bearss’ prose and notes intact, while adding additional sources and commentary of his own. The result is an exceptional study that has finally been made available to the general reading public as part of the Savas Beatie Battles & Leaders Series.

The second installment of Al Ovies’ The Boy Generals trilogy, George Custer, Wesley Merritt and the Cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, from the Gettysburg Retreat through the Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1864, encompasses a period jammed with tumultuous events for the cavalry on and off the battlefield and a significant change of command at the top.Once below the Potomac River, the Union troopers raced down the east side of the Blue Ridge Mountains but were unable to prevent General Lee’s wounded Army of Northern Virginia from reaching Culpeper. The balance of the 1863 was a series of maneuvers, raids, and fighting that witnessed the near-destruction of the Michigan Cavalry Brigade at Buckland Mills and the indecisive and frustrating efforts of the Bristoe Station and Mine Run campaigns. Alfred Pleasonton’s controversial command of the mounted arm ended abruptly, only to be replaced by the more controversial Philip H. Sheridan, whose combustible personality intensified the animosity burning between George Custer and Wesley Merritt.Victory and glory followed the Cavalry Corps during the early days of Overland campaign, particularly at Yellow Tavern, where Rebel cavalier Jeb Stuart was mortally wounded. The “spirited rivalry” between Custer and Merritt, in turn, took a turn for the worse. At Trevilian Station, the bitterness and rancor permeating their relationship broke into the open to include harsh official reports critical of the other’s actions. Merritt’s elevation to temporary command of the 1st Cavalry Division cemented their rancor.Just as their relationship worsened, so too did the tenor of the war darken as the sieges of Richmond and Petersburg ground on, and Confederate partisan Col. John S. Mosby intensified guerrilla operations that disrupted Union logistics in the Shenandoah Valley. When Gen. Ulysses Grant demanded that Sheridan escalate retribution, the cavalry commander delivered his infamous edict to “eat out Virginia clear and clean as far as they go, so that crows flying over it for the balance of the season will have to carry their provender with them.” Much of the gritty task fell on the shoulders of the boy generals.Adolfo Ovies’ well-researched and meticulously detailed account of the increasingly dysfunctional relationship between Custer and Merritt follows the same entertaining style in the first installment. The Boy Generals changes the way Civil War enthusiasts will understand and judge the actions of the Union’s bold riders.

Like many other soldiers who fought in the Civil War, New Orleans newspaper editor William J. Seymour left behind an account of his wartime experiences. It is the only memoir by any field or staff officer of the famous 1st Louisiana Brigade (Hays’ Brigade) in the Army of Northern Virginia. Long out of print, The Civil War Memoirs of Captain William J. Seymour: Reminiscences of a Louisiana Tiger is available once more in this updated and completely revised edition by award-winning author Terry L. Jones.Seymour’s invaluable narrative begins with his service as a volunteer aide to Confederate Gen. Johnson K. Duncan during the 1862 New Orleans campaign. Utilizing his journalistic background and eye for detail, Seymour recalls in great detail the siege of Fort Jackson (the only Southern soldier’s account except for official reports), the bickering and confusion among Confederate officers, and the subsequent mutiny and surrender of the fort’s defenders. Jailed after the fall of New Orleans for violating Maj. Gen. Ben Butler’s censorship order, Seymour was eventually released and joined General Hays’ staff in Virginia.Seymour’s memoirs cover his experiences in the army of Northern Virginia in great detail, including the campaigns of Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, Wilderness, and Shenandoah Valley, ending with the Battle of Cedar Creek in 1864. His pen recounts the activities of the Louisiana Brigade while offering a critical analysis of the tactics and strategies employed by the army.A perceptive and articulate officer, Seymour left behind an invaluable account of the Civil War’s drudgery and horror, pomp and glory. Terry L. Jones’ spare and judicious editing enhances Seymour’s memoirs to create an indispensable resource for Civil War historians and enthusiasts.

Fort Sumter. Charleston. April 1861. The bombardment and surrender of Sumter were only the beginning of the story. Both sides understood the military significance of the fort and the busy seaport, which played host to one of the longest and most complicated and fascinating campaigns of the entire Civil War. Richard Hatcher's Thunder in the Harbor: Fort Sumter and the Civil War is the first modern monograph to document the role of both the fort and the city throughout the entire Civil War. After it was captured, Southern troops immediately occupied and improved Sumter's defenses. The U.S. blockaded Charleston Harbor and for two years the fort, with its 50 heavy guns and 500-man garrison, remained mostly untested. That changed in April 1863, when a powerful combined operation set its sights on the fort, Charleston, and its outer defenses. The result was 22-month land and sea siege, the longest of the Civil War. The widespread effort included ironclad attacks, land assaults, raiding parties, and siege operations. Some of the war's most famous events unfolded there under the direction of a host of colorful personalities, including the assault of African American troops against Battery Wagner (depicted in the movie Glory), the shelling of the city by the "Swamp Angel," and the beginning of submarine warfare when the H. L. Hunley sank the USS Housatonic and was herself lost at sea. The destruction of Fort Sumter remained a key Federal objective throughout the siege. Despite repeated concentrated bombardments of the fort and the city, however, it never fell. The defiant fort, Charleston, and its meandering defensive line were evacuated in February 1865 once word arrived that Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman had taken Columbia, South Carolina and was about to cut off the coastal city. Hatcher, the former historian at Fort Sumter, mined a host of primary sources to produce an in-depth and fascinating account of the intricacies, complexities, and importance of this campaign to the overall war effort. Nearly 18 months of shelling had rendered Fort Sumter almost unrecognizable, but the significance of its location remained. During the eight decades that followed, the United States invested millions of dollars and thousands of hours rebuilding and rearming the fort to face potential foreign threats in three different wars. By the end of World War II, sea and air power had been made Sumter obsolete, and the fort was transferred to the National Park Service. Thunder in the Harbor fills a large gap in the historiography of the war and underscores that there is still much to learn about our endlessly fascinating Civil War.

The fighting prowess of United States Marines is second to none, but few know of the Corps’ humble beginnings and what it achieved during the early years of the American Revolution. That oversight is fully rectified by Jason Bohm’s eye-opening Washington’s Marines: The Origins of the Corps and the American Revolution, 1775-1777. The story begins with the oppressive days that drove America into a conflict for which it was ill-prepared, when thirteen independent colonies commenced a war against the world’s most powerful military with nothing more than local militias, privateers, and other ad hoc units. The Continental Congress rushed to form an army and placed George Washington in command, but soon realized that America needed men who could fight on the sea and on land to win its freedom. Enter the Marines. Bohm artfully tells the story of the creation of the Continental Marines and the men who led them during the parallel paths followed by the Army and Marines in the opening years of the war and through the early successes and failures at Lexington and Concord, Bunker Hill, Canada, Boston, Charleston, and more. As Washington struggled to preserve his command after defeats in New York and New Jersey in 1776, the nascent U.S. Navy and Marines deployed the first American fleet, conducted their first amphibious operation, and waged a war on the rivers and seas to block British reinforcements and capture critically needed supplies. Desperate times forced Congress to detach the Continental Marines from the Navy to join the embattled army as Washington sought an “important stroke” to defeat his adversary. Washington’s Marines joined their fellow soldiers in a protracted land campaign that culminated in turning-point victories at Trenton, Assunpink Creek, and Princeton. This chapter of the Continental Marines ends in Morristown, New Jersey, when Washington granted Henry Knox’s request to leverage the Marines’ expertise with naval guns to fill the depleted ranks of the army’s artillery during the “Forage War.” Washington’s Marines is the first complete study of its kind to weave the men, strategy, performance, and personalities of the Corps’ formative early years into a single compelling account. The sweeping prose relies heavily on primary research and the author’s own extensive military knowledge. Enhanced with original maps and illustrations, Washington’s Marines will take its place as one of the finest studies of its kind.

A deadly and expensive war within a war was waged behind the lines (and often out of the major headlines) in western Kentucky. In 1862, the region was infested with guerrilla activity that pitted brother against brother and neighbor against neighbor in a personal war that often recognized few boundaries. The riding and fighting took hundreds of lives, destroyed or captured millions of dollars of equipment, and siphoned away thousands of men from the Union war effort. Derrick Lindow tells this little-known story for the first time in We Shall Conquer or Die: Partisan Warfare in 1862 Western Kentucky. Confederate Colonel Adam Rankin Johnson and his 10th Kentucky Partisan Rangers regiment wreaked havoc on Union supply lines and garrisons from the shores of southern Indiana, in the communities of western Kentucky, and even south into Tennessee. His rangers seemed unbeatable and uncatchable that second year of the war, especially because of the Partisan Ranger method of temporarily disbanding and melting into the countryside, a tactic relatively easy to execute in a region populated with Southern sympathizers. In the span of just a few months Johnson and his men captured six Union-controlled towns, hundreds of prisoners, and tons of Union army equipment. Union civil and military authorities, meanwhile, were not idle bystanders. Strategies changed, troops rushed to guerrilla flashpoints, daring leaders refused the Confederate demands of surrender, and every available type of fighting man was utilized from Regulars to the militia of the Indiana Legion, temporary service day regiments, and even brown water naval vessels. Clearing the area of partisans and installing a modicum of Union control became one of the Northern war machine’s major objectives. This deadly and expensive war behind the lines was fought by men who often found themselves thrust into unpredictable situations. Participants included future presidential cabinet members, Mexican War veterans, Jewish immigrants, some of the U.S. Army’s rising young officers, and of course the civilians unfortunate enough to live in the borderlands of Kentucky. Author Lindow spent years researching through primary source material to write this important study. The partisan guerrilla fighting and efforts to bring it under control helps put the Civil War in the Western Theater in context, and is a story long overdue.

Fifteen years have passed since the publication of the last biography of Jeb Stuart. Several appeared during the last century lauding his contributions to Confederate fortunes in the Eastern Theater. Each follows a familiar tradition established by hero-worshipping subordinates portraying its subject as a model of chivalric conduct with a romantic’s outlook on life and a sense of fair dealing and goodwill, even toward his enemy. J. E. B. Stuart: The Soldier and the Man, by award-winning author Edward Longacre, is the first balanced, detailed, and thoroughly scrutinized study of the life and service of the Civil War’s most famous cavalryman.Long known to scholars and history buffs alike as “The Beau Sabreur of the Confederacy,” James Ewell Brown Stuart of Virginia was possessed of many gifts, personally and professionally, and led the Army of Northern Virginia’s cavalry to the all-but-complete satisfaction of his superiors. Stuart, insisted Robert E. Lee, “never brought me a piece of false information.” Being human, Stuart also under-performed. On occasion, he underestimated his opponents, took unnecessary risks with his habitually understrength command, failed to properly discipline and motivate his troopers, and was prone to errors both strategic and tactical.These flaws were evident during the Gettysburg Campaign, when his wayward route to the battlefield deprived Lee of the ability to safely negotiate his path toward a climactic confrontation with the Union Army of the Potomac. Because of his outsized wartime reputation—one embellished in the century-and-a-half since—most of Stuart’s errors have passed virtually unnoticed or, when addressed, have been excused or explained away in some fashion.Longacre’s study is based on hundreds of published works, archival sources, and newspapers. He probes not only Stuart’s military career but elements of his character and personality that invite investigation. Even the man’s fiercest partisans admitted that he was vain and inordinately sensitive to criticism, with a curious streak of immaturity—at times the hard-edged veteran, at other times a devotee of the pageantry of war, given to affectations such as ostrich-plumed hats, golden spurs, and the headquarters musicians who accompanied him on the march. Ever motivated by appeals to vanity, he curried the patronage of powerful men and responded readily to the attentions of attractive women even though by 1861, he was a long-married man.Personal flaws and limitations aside, Stuart was popular with his officers and men, beloved by members of his staff, and considered by the people of his state and region the beau ideal of Confederate soldiery. The distinction endures today. Longacre’s J. E. B. Stuart is an attempt to determine its validity.

July, 1862. General Robert E. Lee, now in command of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, had driven back the massive Federal Army of the Potomac from the very gates of the Confederate capital. Richmond was safe – at least for the moment. But soon, new threats emerged against Lee’s army and the Confederate war effort in Virginia. Rumors swirled that a Federal command headed towards Fredericksburg, and a new Federal army, the Army of Virginia, under Maj. Gen. John Pope, was shifting operations towards Confederate communications and supply points. Pope had come from the west, where he had scored successes along the Mississippi River. He brought with him a harder philosophy of war, one that would put pressure not just on Lee’s army but on the population of Virginia itself. Not only alarmed but also offended by “such a miscreant as Pope,” Lee began moving his own forces. He intended to not just counter the new threat but to “suppress” it. In Never Such a Campaign: The Battle of Second Manassas, August 28-30, 1862, historians Robert Orrison and Dan Welch follow Lee and Pope as they converge on ground once-bloodied just thirteen months earlier. Since then the armies had grown in size and efficiency, and combat between them would dwarf that first battle. For the second summer in a row, forces would clash on the plains of Manassas, and the results would be far more terrible.

Lieutenant General James Longstreet’s deployment to East Tennessee promised a chance to shine. The commander of the First Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia had long been overshadowed by his commander, Robert E. Lee, and the now-martyred Second Corp commander, Stonewall Jackson. Lee had nonetheless leaned heavily on Longstreet, whom he called his “Old Warhorse.” Reassigned to the Western Theater because of sliding fortunes there, the Old Warhorse hoped to run free with—finally—an independent command of his own. This experience is depicted in A Fine Opportunity Lost: Longstreet’s East Tennessee Campaign, November 1863 – April 1864 by Ed Lowe (Col., Ret.) For his Union opponent, Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside, East Tennessee offered an opportunity for redemption. Burnside’s early war success had been overshadowed by his disastrous turn at the head of the Army of the Potomac, where he suffered a dramatically lopsided loss at the battle of Fredericksburg followed by the humiliation of “The Mud March.” Removed from army command and shuffled to a less prominent theater, Burnside suddenly found his quiet corner of the war getting noisy and worrisome. The mid-September loss by the Union Army of the Cumberland at the battle of Chickamauga left it besieged in Chattanooga, Tennessee. That, in turn, opened the door to Union-leaning East Tennessee and imperiled Burnside’s isolated force around Knoxville, the region’s most important city. A strong move by Confederates would create political turmoil for Federal forces and cut off Burnside’s ability to come to Chattanooga’s aid.Into that breach marched Longstreet, fresh off his tide-turning role in the Confederate victory at Chickamauga. The Old Warhorse finally had the independent command he had longed for and an opportunity to capitalize on the momentum he had helped create. Longstreet’s First Corps and Burnside’s IX Corps had shared battlefields at Second Manassas, South Mountain, Antietam, and Fredericksburg. Unexpectedly, these two old foes from the Eastern Theater now found themselves transplanted in the Western—familiar adversaries on unfamiliar ground. The fate of East Tennessee hung in the balance, and the reputations of the commanders would be won or lost.

On July 1, 1863, Brigadier General Lysander Cutler commanded the first Union infantry to relieve Brigadier General John Buford’s hard-pressed cavalry on the western outskirts of Gettysburg. The brigade’s stubborn defense along McPherson’s Ridge and the arrival of the famous Iron Brigade stopped the Confederate advance on the town and set the tone for the three-day battle. All of this is laid out in “The Bullets Flew Like Hail:” Cutler’s Brigade at Gettysburg, from McPherson’s Ridge to Culp’s Hill by James L. McLean, Jr. Early in the fight, two of the brigade’s regiments, the 14th Brooklyn and the 95th New York, along with the Iron Brigade’s 6th Wisconsin, participated in one of the most famous assaults of the war. The three regiments simultaneously charged across open ground, repulsed the attack of Brigadier General Joseph Davis’s Rebel brigade, and captured a large number of Mississippi and North Carolina troops protected by an unfinished railroad cut. By the end of July 1, Cutler’s brigade had fought against Confederate brigades led by James Archer, Joseph Davis, Alfred Iverson, Junius Daniels, and Alfred Scales. The brigade was one of the last to leave the field of battle and successfully reformed on Cemetery Hill. On July 2 the brigade was sent to Culp’s Hill. During the evening of July 2 and the early morning hours of July 3, Cutler’s men assisted Brigadier General George Greene’s 12th Corps brigade in repulsing spirited Southern attacks against the Union right flank. In doing so, Cutler’s veterans held the distinction of being among the few Union troops who fought all three days of the battle. The performance of the brigade at Gettysburg came at a great cost. In the battle, only five Union and Confederate brigades sustained 1,000 or more casualties. Cutler’s brigade was one of them. This brigade deserves to be recognized for its heroic performance throughout the fight. Accompanying the text in “The Bullets Flew Like Hail” are 39 detailed maps depicting troop movements throughout each phase of the battle. A photographic supplement provides a look at the battlefield’s terrain and the major personalities discussed within the book.

Few visitors to the Gettysburg battlefield take note of the peculiar grassy rise in the fields southeast of the town between Seminary and Cemetery ridges. It was there that the Bliss home once stood, between the lines in a no-man’s-land during the largest battle ever fought on the American continent. The 60-acre Bliss farm was scene of a brutal back-and-forth clash that began as a fitful episode between lines of skirmishers and ended in a small but important battle all its own. The fight for the possession of this small piece of ground played an oversized role in the battle and directly impacted the rolling Confederate assault on July 2, 1863. Elwood Christ’s extraordinary The Struggle for the Bliss Farm at Gettysburg, July 2nd and 3rd, 1863 remains the only book ever published on the subject. During the morning hours of July 2, 1863, opposing skirmish lines advanced and retreated for hours north of the farm before Confederates finally moved into the Bliss buildings and used them as a sniper’s nest to pick off enemy troops. Union Gen. Alexander Hays dispatched troops to clear them out and the fighting escalated. Within hours a large Confederate division under Gen Richard Anderson was deployed along Seminary Ridge. Posey’s Mississippi brigade, directly west of the farm, assumed an increasingly large role in clearing it of enemy troops. The vortex that was the Bliss farm began pulling in troops from both sides. In a bit more than 24 hours, the back-and-forth fighting would attract at least 10 Union and Confederate regiments, draw heavy artillery fire, disrupt the seemingly unstoppable Confederate assault moving northward against Cemetery Ridge, and kill and wound hundreds of men. The late Elwood Christ based his book on official records, letters, diaries, and other unpublished archival sources. It first appeared to great acclaim in a small print run in 1998. Its return to the general book trade in this facsimile reprint edition, together with a new Foreword by award-winning author and Gettysburg Licensed Battlefield Guide James Hessler, makes it a study every student of the Civil War, and especially of the Gettysburg Campaign, will want to own.

Award-winning authors Scott L. Mingus Sr. and Eric J. Wittenberg are back with the second and final installment of “If We Are Striking for Pennsylvania”: The Army of Northern Virginia’s and Army of the Potomac’s March to Gettysburg. This compelling and bestselling study is the first to fully integrate the military, political, social, economic, and civilian perspectives with rank-and-file accounts from the soldiers of both armies during the inexorably march north toward their mutual destinies at Gettysburg. Gen. Robert E. Lee’s bold movement north, which began on June 3, shifted the war out of the central counties of the Old Dominion into the Shenandoah Valley, across the Potomac, and beyond. The first installment (June 3-22, 1863) carried the armies through the defining mounted clash at Battle of Brandy Station, after which Lee pushed his corps into the Shenandoah Valley and achieved the magnificent victory at Second Winchester on his way to the Potomac. Caught flat-footed, Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker used his cavalry to probe the mountain gaps, triggering a series of consequential mounted actions. The current volume (June 23-30) completes the march to Gettysburg and details the actions and whereabout of each component of the armies up to the eve of the fighting. The large-scale maneuvering in late June prompted General Hooker to move his Army of the Potomac north after his opponent and eventually above the Potomac, where he loses his command to the surprised Maj. Gen. George G. Meade. Jeb Stuart begins his controversial and consequential ride that strips away the eyes and ears of the Virginia army. Throughout northern Virginia, central Maryland, and south-central Pennsylvania, civilians and soldiers alike struggle with the reality of a mobile campaign and the massive logistical needs of the armies. Untold numbers of reports, editorials, news articles, letters, and diaries describe the passage of the long martial columns, the thunderous galloping of hooves, and the looting, fighting, suffering, and dying. Mingus and Wittenberg mined hundreds of primary accounts, newspapers, and other sources to produce this powerful and gripping saga. As careful readers will quickly discern, other studies of the runup to Gettysburg gloss over most of this material. It is simply impossible to fully grasp and understand the campaign without a firm appreciation of what the armies and the civilians did during the days leading up to the fateful meeting at the small crossroads town in Adams County, Pennsylvania.